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The earliest mineral lease at issue in Louisiana jurisprudence 
was presented in Escoubas v. Louisiana Petroleum & Coal Oil 
Co.1 The lease contract there involved a tract of land in Calcasieu 
Parish and was dated October 5, 1865. Interestingly, the Civil War 
only ended six months prior, so this was an old lease indeed. 
From a very early date, the judiciary expressed significant 
skepticism about oil and gas operators and the lease contracts 
under which they operated. For example, the following remarks 
from the Louisiana Supreme Court in Jennings-Heywood Oil 
Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Company2 are instructive as to 
the suspicion—if not outright disdain or hostility—with which 
early courts viewed contracts for the lease of property for oil and 
gas purposes: 
Whether it proceeds from design of crafty speculators in oil 
and gas leases to enshroud their contracts with doubtful, 
ambiguous, inconsistent, and absurd provisions, as a means 
of promoting their interests, or whether it comes from a 
custom in the rural districts of employing unskilled 
draftsmen, it is a notable fact that few subjects of contract 
contribute to the courts an equal proportion of written 
agreements for interpretation. 
This regrettable observation—written a mere six years after the 
discovery of oil in Louisiana—set an unfortunate stage for a study 
of the emergence of both the oil and gas industry, and the 
concomitant need to establish a set of “ground rules” under which 
that industry might operate. 
B. An Industry is Born 
Yandell Boatner, writing for the American Bar Association’s 
Section of Mineral Law in 1939, reported that “[i]n a well drilled 
prior to 1899 in connection with the ice factory at Shreveport, 
natural gas had been found. The gas was used for lighting the 
office at the factory.”3 While self-evidently not commercial 
                                                                                                             
 1. 22 La.Ann. 280 (1870). 
 2. 119 La. 793, 844–5, 44 So. 481, 499 (1907) (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Detamore, 73 N.E. 908 (Ind. 1905)). 
 3. Yandell Boatner, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in 
Louisiana, 60, in SECTION OF MINERAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL HISTORY 




production, it establishes the earliest date of gas production in 
Louisiana as being within the nineteenth century. 
The Louisiana Geological Survey published a very informative 
pamphlet that chronicles the earliest days of the oil and gas 
industry in Louisiana.4 Greater detail of this initial well is provided 
by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources where the 
following is reported, to-wit: 
The first oil well in Louisiana was drilled in 1901 in a rice 
field on the “Mamou Prairie” in the community of 
Evangeline near Jennings. 
The owner of the property, Jules Clement, had noticed 
bubbles rising from a spot in one of his rice fields when it 
flooded. With the recent discovery in Spindle Top in mind, 
he conducted an experiment. He stood on an old stovepipe 
over the bubbles, lit a match, and threw it into the pipe. Gas 
from the bubbles ignited. 
He told friends about this and word spread to Jennings, 
reaching the ears of several interested area businessmen. 
They quietly secured leases on approximately 2000 acres in 
                                                                                                             
 
OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS: A SYMPOSIUM CONSISTING OF 11 PAPERS 
WHICH, AS A WHOLE, GIVE THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF THE OIL 
AND GAS INDUSTRY IN THE PRINCIPLE PRODUCING STATES…. 60 (1938) (citing A. 
C. Veatch, Special Report on the Shreveport Area, in GILBERT D. HARRIS, A. C. 
VEATCH, HEINRICH RIES, CHARLES ARTHUR HOLLICK & GEORGE FRANCIS 
ATKINSON, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE GEOLOGY OF LOUISIANA 199 
(1899)). 
 4. Therein it is stated: 
Louisiana’s oil industry began September 21, 1901, with the discovery 
of oil at Jennings Field. The Jules Clement No. 1 Well was completed 
as a spectacular gusher on this day, spraying a fountain of oil into the 
air at a rate estimated to be 7000 barrels of oil per day. Just 9 months 
earlier, oil had been discovered near Beaumont, Texas, at Spindletop 
Field. Together, the Spindletop and Jennings discoveries ignited an “oil 
rush” of exploration and development activity throughout Texas and 
Louisiana. 
Jennings Field—The Birthplace of Louisiana’s Oil Industry, LOUISIANA 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (September 2001), available at http://www.lgs.lsu.edu/ 
deploy/uploads/9jennings.pdf. Numerous additional accounts of the discovery of 
the Jennings Oil Field can be found in the Carnegie Memorial Library in 
Jennings, Louisiana. See, e.g., A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE 
AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES OF JENNINGS AND 
CALCASIEU PARISH, LOUISIANA (Passenger Dept. of the Southern Pacific-Sunset 
Route, New Orleans, 1910); WALTER D. MORSE, Jules Clement No. 1 Brings Oil 
Industry to Life in Louisiana, in THE BIRTH OF JENNINGS AND JENNINGS FIRSTS 
(1961). 




the vicinity of the seepage and formed S. A. Spencer & 
Company. 
They contacted Scott Heywood, a successful wildcatter in 
Texas, to see if he would be interested in their prospect. 
Heywood visited the area and noted that the land 
formations were much the same as those at Spindle Top 
and conducted his own tests by lighting the bubbles with 
matches. When it burned with a red flame, showing smoke 
at the top of the flame, he was convinced that it was 
petroleum gas. 
Heywood contracted to drill two wells to a depth of 1000 
feet each for an undivided one-half interest in the acreage. 
The contract also provided that he could organize a 
company to be called the Jennings Oil Company. 
A drilling rig was moved from Beaumont to drill the well 
and drilling began on the Jennings Oil Company-Clement 
No. 1 on June 15, 1901. Scott Heywood was the 
superintendent and co-owner. Machinery was shipped from 
Spindle Top. The derrick was 64 feet high and the drill pipe 
(stem) was just ordinary line pipe.5 At about 250 feet there 
was a very small showing of oil in the mud on the top of a 
water sand. Around 400 feet they twisted off a string of 
pipe. 
It was necessary to give up the hole, move over a few feet 
and make a new start. When the specified contract depth of 
1000 feet was reached, oil had not been found. 
Heywood’s contract provided that his second well must be 
started within 30 days after the Jennings Oil Company well 
was finished. It seemed foolish to him to drill another well 
to a depth of 1000 feet to acquire his interest. 
Scott Heywood proposed that Heywood Brothers obtain an 
agreement from Spencer & Company allowing a second 
well to be drilled at the bottom of the Jennings Oil 
Company-Clement No. 1 Well. 
A joint agreement was reached between Spencer & 
Company, Scott Heywood, Jennings Oil Company and 
Heywood Brothers and the contract was signed on August 
11, 1901. 
                                                                                                             
 5. “Heywood commented that he sometimes wondered how they ever 
accomplished what they did in those ‘old days.’ It was 90 days of working in the 
hot sun, fighting mud and mosquitos [sic].” First Oil Well in Louisiana, LA. 
DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder 
&tmp=home&pid=48 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (On that page, it is stated that 
the article “was adopted [sic] from an article by Shelia Esthay in the Jennings 
Daily News.”) 




Heywood Brothers was to drill to a depth of 1500 feet. If 
any favorable indications were found, they were to drill to a 
greater depth, if it was deemed advisable. 
With no favorable results at 1500 feet they ran short of drill 
pipe . . . . Some of the Heywood brothers wanted to call it a 
day, but Scott Heywood insisted on getting more drill pipe 
and going deeper on his own. Alba Heywood felt that the 
brothers should stay with Scott as long as he wanted to 
drill. 
Scott Heywood shipped in more drill pipe, continued to 
drill, and at 1700 feet struck “a very fine showing of oil in 
sugar sand.” More pipe was sent in to finish drilling into 
the sand and when finished there was 110 feet of oil sand. 
Casing was set with a gate valve for protection. After 
running the bailer the second time the well came in, 
flowing a solid four-inch stream of pipeline oil over 100 
feet high. 
The well flowed sand and oil for seven hours and covered 
Clement’s rice field with a lake of oil and sand, ruining 
several acres of rice. 
Oil sand piled up on the derrick floor and for about 100 feet 
around the derrick to a depth of over one foot. 
The well finally gave one big gush of oil and sand and shut 
itself in, sanding up for a distance of 1000 feet in the 
casing. 
On the evening of September 21, 1901, a farmer rushed 
into Jennings with the news that oil had been discovered. 
Washing, bailing, and flushing continued for about 30 days. 
If the sand could have been controlled in that well, it would 
have produced over 7,000 barrels per day. 
One day when the 2-inch pipe was being removed from the 
well after washing the sand out, the well began flowing 
again. 
Before the removal could be completed, however, the well 
sanded up over 1,000 feet and stuck the pipe. Failing in an 
attempt to fish the 2-inch pipe out, the well was abandoned. 
But, the boom had begun! It brought people, money and 
ideas into the area, and the town of Jennings flourished.6 
In Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil 
Company, the Louisiana Supreme Court made the following 
observations as to the then emerging industry as it pertained to 
what would come to be known as the Jennings Field, to-wit: 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id. 




[T]hat at the date of the alleged contract said property was 
much sought after by the parties interested in the discovery 
of oil, as the indications upon said property of the existence 
of oil were very great, and gave great and sudden value to 
said property by reason of the discovery of oil, shortly 
before, at Beaumont, Tex.; that the indications which led to 
the discovery of oil at Beaumont were the same as those 
upon the property, and that the Beaumont discovery, being 
the first in this entire section, was the beginning of wide-
spread search for oil, and that property presenting favorable 
oil indications became valuable beyond all precedent . . . 7 
 
* *   * 
 
Oil was ‘brought in’ on the ‘Spindle Top’ field, near 
Beaumont, Tex. (about 90 or 100 miles from the locus in 
quo), in January, 1901, and was immediately followed by a 
speculative excitement in that vicinity, the accounts of 
which read like those of the ‘South Sea Bubble’; but that 
excitement did not at once, or for several months, extend 
to, or affect values in, the parish of Acadia. It seems, 
however, that the indications which led to the discovery at 
Spindle Top consisted of a seepage of gas in proximity, 
more or less, to a mound, which is situated in an otherwise 
flat prairie, and, as gas seepage was known to exist in many 
places in Acadia, Calcasieu, and other parishes in 
Louisiana, they attracted some renewed attention, and after 
a few months began to be seriously considered. It had been 
known for many years that such a phenomenon existed on 
section 48 (known as the ‘McDaniel Tract’), adjoining 
section 47 on the north, and it was also known that there 
was a mound on Latreille’s prairie, some 1,000 or more feet 
distant from the seepage. About the first persons to act 
upon the idea suggested by those conditions were S. A. 
Spencer, of Jennings, and C. C. Duson, of Crowley; the 
places mentioned being small towns near, though in 
different directions from, the indications referred to. There 
were, sooner or later, associated with Spencer, Messrs. 
Williams, Jaenke, Mehaffey, and Wilkins, and they agreed 
to operate together in the obtention of land and leases 
(principally the latter, as no one seemed to care to invest 
much money in the enterprise), as a basis upon which 
                                                                                                             
 7. April 19, 1901. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille 
Oil Company, 119 La. 793, 864, 44 So. 481, 506 (1907). 




thereafter to find some one with capital, experience, and 
courage enough to exploit their holdings at his own 
expense in the search for oil.8 
C. “Ground Rules” 
So a great industry is born in the Pelican State. No industry can 
flourish without a set of “ground rules” by which land owners, 
industry participants, and legal practitioners might be guided in 
their dealings with one another. The important notion of pre-
dictability in commercial transactions is promoted only if the 
controlling principles are well understood by those concerned with 
such matters. 
In the case of the oil and gas industry, those “ground rules” are 
provided by state law. During the infancy of the industry at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the task of determining those 
“ground rules” in Louisiana was complicated by the fact that 
Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction. In contrast to all of the other 
forty-nine states, whose law is based on the common law of 
England, the essential private law of Louisiana is contained in a 
Civil Code based on French and Spanish authorities and 
precedents. The Louisiana Civil Code was first promulgated in 
1803 and later revised in subsequent editions enacted in 1808, 
1825, and again in 1870.9  
Interestingly, the Codes of 1808 and 1825 were originally 
written in French and accompanied by an English translation. So 
powerful were the French influences on Louisiana law that the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that, “[w]here there is a 
conflict between the English and French texts of the Code of 1825, 
the French text prevails.”10 It was not until 1870 that the Code was 
promulgated in English only.  
The early Codes were heavily influenced by the French texts, 
which presented problems to the courts. The courts encountered 
significant challenges in the consideration of early oil and gas 
issues because the words “oil,” “gas,” or “minerals” did not even 
appear in the early editions of our Civil Code.11 The closest word 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. at 800, 804–07, 44 So. at 484, 486. 
 9. JOSEPH DAINOW, INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY TO THE LOUISIANA 
CIVIL CODE (West 1952). 
 10. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 727–28, 135 So. 38, 40 (1931). 
 11. See Harmon v. Whitten, 390 So. 2d 962 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1980), writ 
denied 396 So. 2d 899 (La. 1981). The words “mineral interest” were first 
introduced into the Civil Code by amendments to Article 741 dealing with suits 
for partition, by Act No. 336 of 1940 and later by Act No. 521 of 1950.  




to the subject matter was the term “mines and quarries,” to which 
reference was made in the articles on usufruct.12 
D. A Civilian’s “Pet Peeve”—Use of Common Law Terms in 
Louisiana Jurisprudence and Legislation 
Any review of the richness of the civil law tradition in 
Louisiana, and the accompanying rejection of the influence of 
common law in our state, would not be complete without mention 
of the most unfortunate predilection of certain judges to employ 
common law terms which have no basis whatsoever in our Civil 
Code. The most compelling example is the use of the term “fee 
simple title” when referring to the ownership of Louisiana 
immovable property. When your author hears this statement in 
reference to Louisiana immovable property—amazingly uttered by 
Louisiana lawyers—the typical response is and should be 
confusion. 
For example, in Fuselier v. Police Jury of Parish of Iberia, the 
court noted: 
In the one case, where complete expropriation is had under 
the articles of the Code, it would seem that the fee, itself, of 
the land, so far as the purpose for which it is wanted is 
concerned, is taken, while in the other, to-wit: the laying 
out of a public road under Rev. St. § 3369, the fee remains 
altogether in the owner of the soil.”13 
If this were an isolated example, it could be tolerated—perhaps 
even forgiven. Regrettably, however, this is but one of a number of 
decisions in which this inappropriate reference is made to a regime 
of property that is totally abhorrent to the civil law. For example, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]t is clear that the 
reversionary mineral interest of the owner of the fee simple title is 
‘a certain object,’ which can be legally sold.”14 Similarly, in Texas 
and Pacific Railway Co. v. Ellerbe, the court noted that “[t]he 
jurisprudence is well settled that the conveyance of a right of way 
is to be regarded as a mere servitude and not as a transfer of a fee-
                                                                                                             
 12. “The usufructuary has a right to the enjoyment and proceeds of mines 
and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct, if they were actually worked 
before the commencement of the usufruct; but he has no right to mines and 
quarries not opened.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 552 (1973) (prior to it by Act No. 
50 of the 1974 Louisiana Legislature). See also Part II(A), infra. 
 13. 109 La. 551, 556–57, 33 So. 597, 599 (1903) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 14. Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 157, 193 So. 570, 573 (1940) 
(emphasis added). 




simple title of the land unless the deed itself evidences that the 
parties intended otherwise.”15 Still again, the court in French v. 
Querbes observed that “[t]he husband and wife, the owners of the 
fee simple title to two separate contiguous tracts of land, instituted 
this action against R. B. Williams . . .”16 In Hicks v. Clark, it was 
stated that “[t]he defendants by mesne conveyances are now the fee 
simple owners of the property.”17 Sadly, numerous other examples 
abound.18 
More unfortunate is the fact that the Legislature has made the 
same mistake.19 For example, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
                                                                                                             
 15. 199 La. 489, 492, 6 So. 2d 556, 557 (1942) (emphasis added). 
 16. 200 La. 654, 656, 8 So. 2d 631, 632 (1942) (emphasis added). 
 17. 225 La. 133, 136, 72 So. 2d 322, 323 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 18. See, e.g., Sun Oil Company v. Kinder Canal Company, 231 La. 1039, 
1044–45, 93 So. 2d 551, 552 (1957) (“The Court also noted that it was not 
necessary for [the grantee] to acquire the strip in fee because a right-of-way was 
sufficient for his canal operations.”) (emphasis added); Sohio Petroleum 
Company v. Hebert, 146 So. 2d 530, 535 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1962), writ denied 
243 La. 1004, 149 So. 2d 763 (1963) (itemizing, as one of the factors to be 
considered, “whether the party claiming the fee title had an actual need for such 
title.”) (emphasis added); Meaux v. Southdown Lands, Inc., 361 So. 2d 974, 977 
(La. App. 3 Cir. 1978) (“The term ‘right of way’ may be used to convey either a 
servitude of passage or fee title of the land. Whether a servitude or fee title is 
meant must be determined from an examination of the instrument as a whole.”); 
Allied Chemical Corporation v. Dye, 441 So. 2d 776, 784 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
1983), writ denied 444 So. 2d 119 (La. 1984) (“Appellants contend that the 
parties to the partition could only have meant to continue as the owner of the 
minerals under all the land involved in the same manner as they owned the full 
fee title to the land.”); Reaux v. Iberia Parish Police Jury, 454 So. 2d 227, 231 n. 
2 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied 458 So. 2d 120 (La. 1984) (“Fee simple title is 
ownership of an estate with unconditional power of disposition, deviation and 
descendibility. In Louisiana this is analogous to full ownership, where the 
elements of ownership (usus, fructus, abusus) are held in common by one 
person.” (citation omitted)). 
 19. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2791 (West 2011) (creating 
conclusive presumption that a transfer of land described as being bounded by a 
road shall convey all interest under the bed of the road, except: 
[W]here the grantor at the time of the transfer or other grant holds as 
owner the title to the fee of the land situated on both sides thereof and 
makes a transfer or other grant affecting the land situated on only one 
side thereof, it shall then be conclusively presumed, in the absence of 
any express provision therein particularly excluding the same 
therefrom, that the transfer or other such grant thereof shall include the 
grantor’s interest to the center of such waterway, canal, highway, road, 
street, alley, railroad, or other right of way.) (emphasis added). 
Other statutes contain the same inappropriate reference. See, e.g., LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41:14 (West 2011) (“No one shall own in fee simple any bottoms 
of lands covering the bottoms of waters described in this Section”); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 19:141 (West 2011) (a port commission can acquire, by 
expropriation, property in “fee simple title”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 




30:210 provides that no state or local governmental agency shall 
issue a permit to “prospect by means of torsion balance, 
seismograph explosions, mechanical device, or otherwise, for 
minerals, or for any other purpose” on any right-of-way held by the 
State or its agencies for highway purposes, “whether owned . . . in 
fee simple, or otherwise,” unless the person getting the permit 
demonstrates that he has given the landowners on either side of the 
right-of-way certain specified written information as to the nature 
of the exploration.20 
To further illustrate the unfortunate propensity of the 
Legislature to utilize common law terminology, which has 
absolutely no basis in Louisiana’s organic law, it is noted that, 
prior to its repeal in 1979,21 and its replacement by the Louisiana 
Condominium Act,22 the Louisiana Horizontal Property Act23 
provided that “[a]ny apartment may be held and owned by more 
than one person as joint tenants, as tenants in common, as tenants 
by the entirety, or in any other real estate tenancy relationship 
recognized under the laws of this state.”24 That is a peculiar 
statement indeed since not a single one of the identified 
relationships has ever been “recognized under the laws of this 
state.” It makes one wonder if there were Louisiana-educated 
lawyers in the Louisiana Legislature in 1962 and if there were, 
whether they read the bill. 
In criticizing the use of such common law language by a recent 
Louisiana court decision,25 Professor J. R. “Randy” Trahan, the 
Louis B. Porterie Professor of Law at the Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center, Louisiana State University, said: 
To talk of “fee” is inappropriate—the concept of “fee”, 
[sic] though a fixture of the common law of property, is 
completely unknown to the civil law. Consequently, in a 
discussion of issues arising under Louisiana property law, 
                                                                                                             
 
48:1255(11) (West 2011) (the Louisiana DOTD may acquire property in “fee 
simple absolute”). 
 20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:210(A)–(B) (West 2012). 
 21. 1979 La. Acts 682. 
 22. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1121 (West 1979). 
 23. Originally adopted by Act No. 494 of the 1962 Louisiana Legislature. 
1962 La. Acts 494. 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1125 (repealed 1979). 
 25. Capital One v. City of Alexandria, 439 B.R. 379 (W.D. La. 2010). 




which, of course, is part of Louisiana’s civil law, any 
mention of “fee” is altogether out of place.26 
As unfortunate as these references are, they are all the more 
dramatic by virtue of the fact that they are written by judges—even 
justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court—rather than merely being 
a reiteration or recitation of arguments made by litigants.  
The practice is actually rather curious in view of the fact that 
the very early courts recognized the impropriety of presuming the 
application of English common law merely by virtue of the 
employment of words, terms or concepts inherent in that body of 
law. For example, in the 1813 decision in Agnes v. Judice, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court said: 
The common law names in judicial proceedings have 
naturally been adopted in a practice which is carried on in 
the English language, but they ought to be considered 
rather as a translation of the names formerly used, than as 
emanations from the English jurisprudence. . . [B]ut their 
adoption as words can, by no rule of law, or common sense, 
be considered as having introduced the English practice 
itself.27 
A decade and a half later, in Abat v. Whitman,28 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court refused to apply English precedents merely by 
virtue of the fact that the Legislature utilized terms from that 
system, saying: “The use of common law terms is easily accounted 
for, in the desire of the legislature to use those words which would 
convey in the most clear and concise manner, to persons 
acquainted with the English language alone, the remedies 
defined.”29 
One court rejected any application of common law regimes of 
ownership in the following words, to-wit: 
                                                                                                             
 26. John Randall Trahan, The Law of Property, Sales & Leases, in 2 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGISLATION & JURISPRUDENCE 1–72 (2011). 
 27. 3 Mart. (O.S.) 182, 185–86 (1813). 
 28. 7 Mart. (N.S.) 162 (1828). 
 29. So important is the notion that, in Louisiana, the institutions of the 
common law cannot be incorporated by reference, that the Constitution of 1921 
admonished that the “Legislature shall never adopt any system or code of laws 
by general reference to such system or code of laws; but in all cases shall recite 
at length the several provisions of the laws it may enact.” LA. CONST. art. III, § 
18 (1921). It was noted in LeBlanc v. City of New Orleans that the predecessor 
to this constitutional provision was “especially directed . . . against [the adoption 
of] the ‘common-law’ and ‘equity’ systems established in the other states.” 138 
La. 243, 257, 70 So. 212, 217 (1915). See also LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(B) 
(1974).  




Rules governing the common-law relation of joint tenancy 
and tenancy in common have no application to a case of 
this character arising in this state. Ownership of property, 
real or personal, in this state may arise only in the manners 
expressly established and recognized by its laws; and 
divestiture of such ownership may be effectuated only in 
the manner and form as by them directed.30 
If, as Abraham Lincoln once said, “[a] lawyer’s time and 
advice are his stock in trade,” then, certainly, words or legal terms 
are the currency by which such trade is conducted. Those who 
practice their trade in the civil law system are not without 
appropriate words or terminology with which to transact such 
business. There simply is no need to use an alien term that has 
absolutely no meaning in our state. 
II. JUDGES MADE THE “GROUND RULES” 
A. The Civil Code Was Silent as to Oil and Gas and Mineral Rights 
Because oil and gas were products unknown to the redactors of 
the Civil Code, and in the absence of other legislation on the 
subject matter of oil and gas, it became the task of the courts to 
“hammer out” the “ground rules” by a process of analogy to the 
disparate provisions in the Civil Code—a document which, as 
noted, was totally silent on the important subject matter.  
On numerous occasions, the Justices of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court expressed seeming frustration with the task before them. The 
Court has made many statements with regard to the absence of 
legislative guidance in the Civil Code. 
In Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court 
held that: 
Gas and oil leases and contracts are a part by themselves. 
There is scarcely any comparison between them and the 
ordinary farm or house lease, although there is some 
resemblance in them to coal or solid mineral leases. The 
Code is silent as to such contracts; for the reason, 
doubtless, that minerals under and within the soil of 
Louisiana were not in the contemplation of the lawmakers 
at the time that the Code was adopted. The Legislature up 
to this time has been silent upon the subject of mineral 
rights and contracts. The law with reference to sales and 
leases found in the Code cannot be unreservedly applied to 
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these contracts. Such contracts partake of the nature of both 
sale and lease, and they have features that are not 
applicable to either.31 
In Natalie Oil Co. v. Louisiana Railway & Naval Co., the 
Court noted the difficulty with the articles of the Code of Practice 
because “they were framed at a time when the nature and existence 
of oil under the soil of this state was not supposed or known, and 
the laws were not therefore framed to meet such things and the 
conditions surrounding them.”32 
Again noting the newness of “mining,” the Court stated in 
Spence v. Lucas: 
Until the Legislature shall have passed laws specially 
applicable to the industry of mining, which is a new one in 
this state, the parties engaged in those pursuits and the 
courts of the state will adhere to the jurisprudence on the 
subject, and treat mineral contracts as leases.33 
And later in Demoss v. Sample, the Court stated, “There has 
been little legislation in this state on mining contracts, and there 
have been few adjudications on the subject.”34 
Concerning the interpretation of oil and gas contracts, the 
Court stated in Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.: 
This court has consistently applied the codal provisions, 
whenever applicable, to oil and gas leases for many years. 
Having declined to enact laws for the regulation of the oil 
industry and, particularly, having declined to adopt a 
Mineral Code, the Legislature has placed the stamp of 
approval upon the system of interpretation of oil and gas 
contracts which this court has followed for so many 
years.35 
And again, in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pickney, the Court stated: 
[T]he Civil Code was adopted [when] the oil industry was 
not in existence. Consequently, the framers of the Code did 
not contemplate the various questions and problems arising 
in the course of the industry. The Legislature has not seen 
fit to adopt statutes sufficient to guide the courts in 
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determining the various controversies arising in this 
industry. Under such circumstances, the court was 
compelled to apply the articles of the Civil Code that were 
most applicable to the nature of the rights asserted . . . . It 
must be borne in mind that we had no exact rule to apply 
and consequently applied the articles of the Code most 
applicable to the nature of the right involved.36 
Judge John Minor Wisdom, who served with distinction as a 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, for 
forty-two years, made a similar observation with regard to the 
development of the rules pertinent to the mineral servitude, as 
follows: 
The juristic accomplishment of fitting oil and gas transac-
tions into the codal law of praedial servitudes is a tour de 
force illustrative of the theory of the Code as a compilation 
of principles, not a digest of specific laws. As with many 
similar tours de force, although the result as a whole is in 
keeping with civilian concepts, some specific results are far 
from perfect. We recognize, therefore, that courts should 
not expect a perfect fit in cloaking a mineral servitude (the 
right to explore for oil and gas) with ancient laws designed 
for such servitudes as the right of passage. Louisiana courts 
have utilized this latitude to make logical extensions of the 
scope of the servitude doctrine, if such extensions are in 
keeping with the principle underlying the doctrine.37 
More contemporary opinions by the Louisiana Supreme Court 
also recognize the significant role of the courts in the development 
of the body of law which is mineral rights, as noted by this passage 
in Andrus v. Kahao, viz.: 
The Louisiana Civil Code substantially predates the 
development of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana. 
Consequently, the framers of the Code did not contemplate 
the many and varied legal questions and problems which 
would arise in the course of development of that industry. 
With scant Codal or other statutory guidance this Court was 
called upon to resolve legal questions, and decide cases in 
which such questions arose.38  
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B. The Role of the Judiciary in Formulating the “Ground Rules” 
In view of the foregoing, it is both necessary and appropriate to 
acknowledge the role which the Louisiana judiciary has played in 
the origin and development of the “ground rules” pertinent to 
mineral rights. As noted above, with very few exceptions, the 
entire body of the law pertinent to mineral rights in general has 
evolved through the rendition of court decisions.  
In Professor Harriet Spiller Daggett’s seminal treatise Mineral 
Rights in Louisiana, she noted that the first Louisiana oil and gas 
case was decided in 187039 and described the “law of oil and gas” 
as “new and without precedent,”40 “[t]he vocabulary dealing with 
it” as “new,”41 and the decisions of other states of “small value 
because Louisiana is a civil-law state with an old civil code.”42 
Professor Daggett stated: 
The Louisiana courts deserve unstinting praise for the 
formulations of the governing principles regarding mineral 
law. The meshing of the old articles of the code for traction 
in a modern and peculiar industry was not an easy task. 
 
* *    * 
 
The decisions of other states were of small value [to the 
process of developing the mineral law of Louisiana] 
because Louisiana is a civil-law state with an old civil 
code. The French, Spanish, and Roman sources furnished 
no precedents because the problem was unknown to those 
forefathers. The judiciary has ever been a determining 
factor in defining frontier interpretation of new social and 
economic policies. The history of legal thought cannot ne-
glect the role of judge-made law. Louisiana jurisprudence 
on oil and gas is a continuing tribute to the patience, 
research, wisdom, and fairness of the members of the bench 
of the state. The evolution in the hands of judges of the 
present body of law dealing with one of the most valuable 
property rights known in the state should restore the 
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confidence of every citizen in the democratic judicial 
process, if such confidence has ever wavered.43 
Another treatise of the early days makes the following 
commentary on this point: 
The result has been that much has been left to interpretation 
and court-made law, because, as shown further on, the 
statutory enactments have been few and far between, with a 
consequent loss on the part of the State and the land owners 
and independent operators, who are the ones who have had 
cause to complain about this inactivity. 
 
* *    * 
 
So far as the statutory law of the State is concerned, the 
lawmakers have been rather lax in dealing with these great 
natural resources and the industries engaged in their devel-
opment. 
The discovery of oil in Louisiana found the State with no 
mining laws, as that industry was unknown in this section. 
The few antiquated sections of the Code and statutes which 
might apply were evidently casual and accidental expres-
sions and illustrations enacted without the remotest idea 
that they would ever apply to the production of oil and 
gas.44 
Judge Albert A. Tate, Senior, in a dissenting opinion in Reagan 
v. Murphy, noted: 
But it must be remembered that the development of the 
mineral law in Louisiana has, in the absence of comprehen-
sive legislative enactment, been left to the judiciary. Case 
by case the Louisiana Supreme Court has been forced to 
develop from the ancient concepts of our civil code the 
rules and principles to apply to the infinitely variegated 
problems of a complex and ever changing industry. 
Without legislative guidance in the main, and utilizing 
codal articles devised when the existence of modern oil 
development was unimagined, the court has properly taken 
into account the general public interest of the 
commonwealth when resolving by civilian principles the 
competing interests of the landowners and of the oil-
producers and their financiers. The jurisprudence thus 
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evolved has received well nigh universal approbation and 
has been ratified by legislative acceptance without 
fundamental change as to the regulation of mineral property 
rights evolving through this enlightened judicial 
interpretation.45 
Finally, Professor J. Denson Smith, Director of the Louisiana 
State Law Institute, made the following observation on this point: 
The production, refining, transportation and distribution of 
oil and gas probably constitute the most valuable industry 
in Louisiana. Nevertheless Louisiana’s basic mineral law 
has been established largely by analogy to provisions of the 
Civil Code, and because these analogies have not been 
always precise, its logical development and extension have 
presented many difficulties.46 
C. Methodology Employed by the Courts in Developing the 
“Ground Rules” 
1. Judicial Improvisation 
For the most part, by reason of the total absence of direct, 
controlling principles in the Civil Code, the courts had to utilize 
methods of analogy in order to construct the “ground rules” to 
regulate the ownership and production of oil and gas. As will be 
seen, one court aptly referred to this process as “judicial 
improvisation.” Generally, these analogies were made to the 
articles of the Civil Code regulating predial servitudes as it related 
to the mineral servitude, to the articles on “rent” when it concerned 
the mineral royalty, and to the codal articles on lease as it pertained 
to the mineral lease.  
2. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs 
This process of judicial improvisation is perhaps best 
illustrated by the Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis in the 
influential case proposing that, in Louisiana, there is no such thing 
as a “mineral estate.” Thus, in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. 
Salling’s Heirs,47 the court was called upon to decide the nature of 
a grant or reservation of minerals.  
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It is doubtful that there has been a more comprehensively 
briefed case in the Louisiana Supreme Court. The case was 
pending before the Court for more than two years, during which 
the composition of the Court changed several times.48  
There was much interest in the case as the industry needed an 
answer to these questions:  
1. Can a landowner dispose of his rights to oil and gas? 
2. If so, what is the nature and effect of such disposition? 
Although several prior cases had answered the threshold 
question in the affirmative, no case considered the nature of such a 
disposal or reservation with regard to the prescription of non-
user.49 
At this early developmental, almost “pioneering,” stage of the 
industry, most conveyances of mineral rights were accomplished 
on forms that came with the industry from other producing states. 
By and large, these forms generally sounded as though the oil and 
gas was being sold in place. 
Why is Frost-Johnson important, both as a matter of 
substantive oil and gas law and as an example of civilian analysis? 
The decisional process embodied in this opinion is a classic 
example of civilian analysis. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in 
Justice Provosty’s concurring opinion on first rehearing, observed 
that “[o]il and gas were unknown as subjects of ownership at the 
time of the adoption of our Code. How far, therefore, that kind of 
property would be subject to a strict application of the provisions 
of our Code may be a question.”50 
If, in this process of reaching a decision based upon the 
provisions of the Civil Code, the objective is to find codal 
authority (either direct or through the process of analogy), it might 
be said that the case could have gone either way.  
There was support for the proposition that minerals were 
susceptible of ownership in place because Article 505 of the Civil 
Code provided, as follows: 
The ownership of the soil carries with it the ownership of 
all that is directly above and under it. 
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* *    * 
 
[The owner] may construct below the soil all manner of 
works, digging as deep as he deems convenient, and draw 
from them all the benefits which may accrue, under such 
modifications as may result from the laws and regulations 
concerning mines and the laws and regulations of the 
police.51 
Further support was to be found in the language of the contract 
in question. Certainly as to solid minerals, the language was more 
suggestive of a sale in place—the so-called “mineral estate.”52  
On the other hand, there was also support for the contrary 
view. Article 519 of the Civil Code provided, “[p]igeons, bees, 
fish, which go from one pigeon house, hive or fish pond, into 
another pigeon house, hive or fish pond, belong to the owner of 
those things; provided, such pigeons, bees or fish have not been 
attracted thither by fraud or artifice.”53 
Looking to the deed in question, speaking in terms of “the 
exclusive right and privilege,” the reservation in Frost-Johnson 
could easily be interpreted as being in the nature of a servitude, or 
at least some regime less than full ownership, as to oil and gas.54 
Such being the case, the decision was driven by considerations 
of public policy. Some of the policy considerations on which the 
Court relied were the following: 
First, the development of the natural resources of the State was 
a prominent feature of the decision and was the focus of briefs 
filed by the several amicus curiae. 
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The Court was also motivated to prohibit the practice of 
speculation55 in minerals which might result if an estate in 
minerals had been embraced. Indeed, this policy consideration was 
an underpinning of the decision by Justice O’Niell in his dissenting 
opinion on first rehearing, as observed:  
I cannot see how it imposes any hardship upon the owner 
of a right to extract the mineral oil or gas from the land of 
another to require that he shall exercise his right within 10 
years or allow it to go back into commerce. That has been 
the law of this state from the beginning of her history.56 
Another important consideration pertained to the economic 
utilization of land. In that regard, the ruling prevents old, stale 
claims to land from destroying the surface owner’s development. 
Honoring the uncomplicated regimes of civil law property, the 
Court fostered simplicity of titles in that it disapproves of the 
dismemberment of the so-called mineral estate from the so-called 
surface estate. The impermissibility of creating separate estates 
under the civil law was recognized in the ruling in Wemple v. 
Nabors Oil & Gas Co.57 
Finally, an important consequence of the Court’s decision 
results in the eventual return of wealth to the landowner. The 
“fundamental reasons of public policy which have dictated [the] 
application of this rule” were stated in one case, as follows: 
A recognition that prolonged divorce of the ownership of 
the land from the undeveloped mineral interest thereunder 
is detrimental to the welfare of the State, both as tending to 
inhibit development of our mineral resources (without the 
spur of a time limit and of a financially interested 
landowner), and as tending to divert in the event of 
production the royalty rentals therefrom away from the 
local landowner and the local community often into the 
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hands of such absentee financial interests as for long range 
investment acquire mineral interests at a time when 
virtually valueless on the open market.58 
Professor Daggett commented on the mineral servitude as 
ordained by Frost-Johnson as follows: 
It is a new variety of personal servitude like unto (sic) a 
railroad right of way—indivisible and heritable. It is sui 
generis in servitudes and does not fall precisely into any 
predetermined groove; hence, it cannot always be governed 
by the letter of the articles of the Code. The court might 
well have taken the attitude that they maintained in 
insurance law and declared the right sui generis in toto and 
not governed by the articles of the Code just as they 
declared that the articles on donations would not apply to 
insurance. They took a less arbitrary course, much more 
troublesome to themselves, and fitted the applicable articles 
of the Code, discarding those in which the letter would 
have been against public policy and inimical to the 
protection of private rights. The failure to apply the 
fundamental principles of the law of donation to insurance 
has resulted in a method of partially circumventing the 
most sacred doctrines of the law of successions, i.e., the 
doctrine of forced heirship, substitutions, and fidei 
commissa. No such violence to the ideals of tenure and use 
of property in this state is found in the law of oil and gas.59 
In the humble view of the author, Frost-Johnson is the single 
most important mineral law decision ever rendered by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. Although its current relevance as 
jurisprudential authority is arguably minimized since the 
enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code, the fact remains that the 
policy announced by the decision has resulted in the eventual 
return of mineral wealth to the landowner.60 
The wisdom of this approach is demonstrated by the 
experience of other oil and gas states—such as Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Mississippi—where distant or ancient owners of minerals 
cannot be found, resulting in wells which were not drilled. The 
experience of these sister states demonstrates that minerals were 
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often bought and resold on a widespread, speculative basis such 
that today, many of the original owners, or their heirs, cannot be 
found. Since these heirs cannot be found, the land in question 
cannot be leased; and, since the land cannot be leased, the well 
cannot be drilled. There is no way to tell how many otherwise 
geologically meritorious exploratory wells have not been drilled 
for this reason. 
3. Other Cases Employing the Same Methodology 
The courts have, by analogy, ascertained the controlling rules 
applied to mineral servitudes in other cases. 
For example, in Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court noted that the Court has “been called upon to 
decide and from our efforts to apply consistently, by analogy, the 
articles of the Code relating to predial servitudes in the 
development of the mineral law of this state.”61 
In Mire v. Hawkins, the Court stated this proposition, as 
follows: 
In the absence of a mineral code, it long ago became the lot 
of this Court to adjudge the nature of mineral rights, and 
the obligations and advantages flowing from contracts 
affecting such rights, within the framework of our civil law. 
In performance of this task, the Court has consistently held 
that the sale or reservation of minerals creates a real right in 
the nature of a servitude and during the years has developed 
and extended the doctrine, by analogy, to those provisions 
of the Civil Code which relate to real or predial 
servitudes.62  
To the same effect, the Court in Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen 
stated the following: 
In the evolution of the mineral law in the State, it was 
recognized that the sale or reservation of a mineral right, 
having been classed as a servitude, was subject to the 
applicable articles of the Civil Code in the resolution of 
conflicting claims; and in deciding the early and landmark 
case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, supra, the precedent 
upon which succeeding decisions, including Childs v. 
Washington, supra, and Jumonville Pipe and Machinery 
Co. v. Federal Land Bank, supra, were predicated, we 
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concluded the articles of the Civil Code in Title IV, 
entitled, ‘Of Predial Servitudes or Servitudes of Land’, 
whenever applicable were controlling.63 
Finally, in Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., this process 
was explained in the following words: 
By judicial improvisation, relying largely upon the analogy 
to principles of lease and servitude, Louisiana’s courts have 
evolved a body of rules applicable to an industry unknown 
when the Civil Code was adopted. The shaping of the basic 
precepts began almost 50 years ago. In 1922, Louisiana’s 
Supreme Court held that a landowner does not own the oil 
and gas beneath his property.64 
While not being critical, it would be an understatement to say 
that the results of this methodology were, on occasion, haphazard. 
Whenever one leaves to the “whim of man” the development, in a 
legal vacuum, of “ground rules” of this type, it necessarily and 
understandably leads to inconsistencies that result in a system 
lacking in predictability.  
Perhaps this is best illustrated by a candid admission by Justice 
Fournet, the opinion author of the important mineral royalty case 
Vincent v. Bullock.65 It has been reported that the Vincent decision 
was the result of a pre-opinion judicial conference that decided the 
result to be reached, but left to Justice Fournet the construction of a 
theory to follow in order to reach the result. Justice Fournet later 
admitted this, in saying: 
In accordance with our system of assigning cases by 
rotation, it fell to me. The court, without determining how 
the conclusion was to be reached, instructed me, in terms 
amounting to an ultimatum, to find a way to cut off this 
new right by the same prescription applicable to the 
mineral servitude, of which it was an appendage as it 
were.66 
Thus, unlike the mineral servitude, there was no sound, valid 
conceptual theory to support the mineral royalty. 
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As has been noted by both judges67 and commentators,68 the 
process of eking out the “ground rules” by a process of analogy 
based upon Civil Code articles regulating predial servitudes, is far 
from perfect. Given the myriad of issues presented by the creation, 
ownership, administration, maintenance, and transfer of mineral 
rights, the process of judicial improvisation to which the judiciary 
had resorted is all the more worthy of respect.  
At the same time, the other side of that coin gave wide latitude 
to litigants to advance arguments which, working in a void, cannot 
be said to be expressly contrary to any positive law since such did 
not exist. Thus, it might be said that a litigant—testing as it were 
the outer limits of this imperfect process—was a sort of “pioneer” 
in terms of advancing arguments in favor of the client’s position.69  
Thus, by reason of the absence of express authority to the 
contrary (or, indeed, of any positive law one way or the other), 
good faith arguments were made—albeit in each case 
unsuccessfully—by such “pioneers,” as follows: 
• That the Frost-Johnson decision was unsound as being 
based on an incorrect premise, viz., that, because oil and 
gas are migratory or fugitive, they are insusceptible of 
ownership separate from the soil;70 
• That a regime of co-ownership exists between the surface 
owner and the owner of a mineral servitude burdening that 
land, sufficient to authorize partition between such 
parties;71 
• That the granting of a mineral lease by a landowner before 
the expiration for non-use of a mineral servitude burdening 
the land constituted an obstacle which suspended the 
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prescription accruing against the pre-existing mineral 
servitude;72 
• That prescription accruing against a mineral servitude was 
suspended by reason of the existence of a pre-existing 
mineral lease;73 
• That a mineral servitude is not heritable, and, hence, 
necessarily terminates at the death of its owner;74 
• That the release by the lessee of a mineral lease covering a 
mineral servitude effected a division of the underlying 
mineral servitude;75 
• That a vendor of an interest in an existing mineral servitude 
warrants the effectiveness or continuation of the 
servitude;76 
• That prescription does not accrue against a mineral 
servitude subject to a pre-existing mineral servitude as the 
latter constitutes an obstacle;77 
• That public policy imposed a limit on the maximum size of 
a mineral servitude;78 
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surrounding the prospective well.”). 




• That, by reserving the so-called “reversionary right,” 
parties could contractually provide that a mineral servitude, 
upon its extinction by prescription, should return to a third 
party other than the surface owner;79 
• That a servitude owner commits “an alleged trespass to [the 
burdened] property by the construction [by the lessee of the 
mineral servitude owner] of a roadway;” and80 
• That parties may contractually alter the rules of use so as to 
keep a mineral servitude alive beyond ten years without a 
use.81 
While, as noted, each of these arguments advanced by the 
“pioneers” was rejected by the courts, the fact that they could be 
advanced, consistent with ethical limitations on litigants, is further 
demonstration of the prudence of the development and enactment 
of a codification of the law pertinent to oil and gas. 
E. A Lawyer’s Dilemma 
The several pronouncements noted above and the opportunities 
for “pioneering” are quite instructive as to the state of affairs 
which prevailed prior to the enactment of the Mineral Code. This 
dilemma aptly highlights the uncertainty in the law and the 
concomitant difficulty confronting a practicing lawyer who is 
called upon to give advice to a client desiring to expend 
considerable amounts of money in the drilling of a well. 
As has been demonstrated, for the most part, the pre-Code, 
judge-made body of Louisiana jurisprudence on mineral rights was 
formed through a process of “bending and molding” disparate 
articles or principles in the Civil Code to address this emerging, 
and later developing, industry. Hence, one can best appreciate the 
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consequences of the absence of a codified set of laws when one 
gives consideration to the predicament of the practitioner who, 
prior to the Code’s adoption in 1975 (and certainly, in the 
pioneering decades of the 1920s through the 1950s), might be 
called upon by a client for advice as to how to be absolutely certain 
that a proposed activity would constitute a “use” sufficient to avoid 
prescription accruing against a mineral servitude. In essence, the 
only thing that the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frost-Johnson 
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs82 did was to characterize the 
(conveyed or reserved) mineral interest as being in the nature of a 
servitude subject to the prescription of nonuse. Beyond that, the 
court in Frost-Johnson did not provide the essential “ground rules” 
as to the myriad of activities that would constitute a “use” of the 
servitude.  
Thus, particularly heightened was the lawyer’s challenge to 
advise an oil and gas lessee who desired to drill a well on the lands 
covered by a mineral lease granted by the owner of a mineral 
servitude that was approaching a prescriptive date. Without the 
benefit of the guidance and clarity now provided by the Mineral 
Code, one can imagine the challenge of explaining to such a client 
the types of activities on the servitude that would constitute a “use” 
sufficient to interrupt prescription. Without the benefit of a prior 
court case, and until the courts had ruled on the matter, would not 
such advice necessarily be in the category of the lawyer’s “best 
guess”? The client was prepared to spend significant amounts of 
capital to drill a well without the benefit of the “ground rules” 
previously mentioned. This thought, if no other, illustrates the 
benefit to the practitioner of a written set of laws now found in the 
Mineral Code. 
III. WRITING IT DOWN—THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE 
A. A Move Towards a Codification 
The confluence of the emerging industry with the absence of a 
consistent, predictable set of “ground rules” to govern such 
industry gave rise to a movement toward codification of the law of 
Louisiana pertinent to mineral rights, including oil and gas. Indeed, 
the need for a codification of the law of oil and gas was observed 
by Justice Hamiter who, in a concurrence, noted that the developed 
jurisprudence on the mineral servitude (with which he disagreed) 
had nonetheless “established a rule of property, and I shall 
recognize and respect it until changed by the Legislature, either 
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through the adoption of a mineral code, which is very much needed 
in this state, or otherwise.”83  
By Joint Resolution of the Louisiana Legislature adopted as 
Act No. 170 of 1936, it was determined that: 
It shall be the duty of the Governor…to appoint a 
Commission composed of five (5) citizens of the State of 
Louisiana, three of whom shall be lawyers who have been 
practicing law in the State not less than ten (10) years and 
who are learned in the laws relating to oil, gas and 
minerals, and two of whom shall be citizens of the State 
who have had not less than five (5) years practical 
experience in the buying, selling, leasing or operating oil, 
gas or mineral rights within the State, whose duty it shall be 
to prepare a draft of a Code to be known as “A Code of the 
Oil, Gas and Mineral Laws of the State of Louisiana,” 
which code shall codify all the laws of the State relative to 
the private ownership, leasing, selling, mortgaging of oil, 
gas and other minerals, or otherwise dealing therein, and 
rights relating thereto or connected therewith.84 
In compliance, Richard W. Leche, Governor of Louisiana, took 
steps to form a Commission to study the subject matter of mineral 
law and charged that commission with the task of making a 
recommendation as to whether a mineral code should be adopted. 
Sidney L. Herold, Esq., of Shreveport, Louisiana, was appointed as 
the Chair of the Commission which was comprised of the leaders 
of the bar and judiciary in this state as well as individuals having 
“practical experience in the buying, selling, leasing or operating 
oil, gas or mineral rights within the State.”85  
As reported by the late W. Lee Hargrave, Professor of Law at 
the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, in his authoritative history of LSU 
Law School: 
Distinguished Louisiana lawyers also lectured during 
Spring 1938. Sidney L. Herold, a prominent Shreveport 
attorney, delivered a lecture titled “Some Problems 
Involved in Drafting a Mineral Code for Louisiana.” 
Ironically, the top story in the Reveille on the day that 
Herold’s lecture was announced featured photographs of a 
gushing oil well, Duplantier No. 1, located in the 
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University Field south of the Campus. The University had 
leased its 2,100 acres for mineral production in 1936, and it 
started earning substantial oil and gas revenues, adding to 
its prosperity. 86 
Mr. Herold, to whom reference was above made, offered the 
following interesting comments on April 22, 1938 at a Symposium 
on the Proposed Louisiana Mineral Code: 
I believe a fair reading of the Code will convince the 
members of the bar that there is nothing in the Proposed 
Mineral Code except principles which have been a part of 
the civil law since there has been a civil law jurisprudence; 
that there is nothing in the Proposed Code that departs from 
a proper interpretation of the Civil Code of the State; that it 
seeks to bring into Louisiana no new or foreign jurispru-
dence. It endeavors simply to apply to actual conditions 
arising with respect to drilling and mining for minerals in 
this State those civil law principles on which we were 
raised, upon which our predecessors at the bar were raised 
and upon which we expect our successors at the bar to be 
raised.87 
The work of the Commission continued at a later date under 
the capable direction of its last Reporter, George W. Hardy, III, 
Professor of Law at LSU Law School and later Dean of the 
University of Kentucky School of Law, who succeeded Professor 
Nabors in 1963. 
In a precursor publication to the eventual Mineral Code, 
Professor Hardy noted the following: 
As is commonly known, the mineral property system in 
Louisiana has been built piece by piece through analogies 
to articles of the Civil Code which were not structured 
specifically to cope with the legal problems attendant upon 
exploration for and extraction of minerals on the broad 
scale which has occurred in Louisiana as the result of 
intensive petroleum exploration and production. The 
bending and warping of Civil Code concepts, the 
application of articles from varying parts of the Code in 
sometimes awkward circumstances, and the flimsiness of 
some of the analogies which have been made inhibit, if not 
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prohibit, intelligent, organized consideration of Louisiana 
mineral law in the conceptualism of the Civil Code.88 
B. A Mineral Code is Enacted 
The efforts of the various commissions finally came to fruition 
in 1974 when the Legislature enacted Act Number 50 of 1974. The 
Louisiana Mineral Code was codified as Title 31 of the Revised 
Statutes. It became effective on January 1, 1975. 
As originally enacted, the Code contained 214 articles. Since 
its inception, additional sections have been added, others repealed, 
and various amendments have been adopted. 
As was the purpose of the Commission, the Code generally 
represents a codification and clarification of the body of mineral 
law theretofore established by the judiciary. This was explained by 
Professor Hardy, as follows: 
The Mineral Code is designed in large measure to supplant 
by way of codification the extensive jurisprudence that 
developed in this area of the law. Louisiana’s existing 
mineral law was a product of jurisprudential development 
principally by way of analogy to the provisions of the 
Louisiana Civil Code relating to servitudes but including 
particularly also the general rules of conventional 
obligations and leases. In other words, before the adoption 
of the Mineral Code, the mineral law reposed in decisions 
of the courts, principally the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
rather than in a codification. The basic result of the judicial 
determination that sales and reservations of minerals do not 
constitute a dismemberment of ownership in perpetuity but 
merely give rise to servitudes is that under the provisions of 
the Civil Code the servitudes so established expire for 
nonuse in ten years and the land is no longer burdened by 
them. There has been general agreement with the wisdom 
that characterized the adoption of these basic principles by 
the courts; nevertheless, the extensive volume of 
jurisprudence that had been developed was lacking, as must 
necessarily be the case, in the coherence that is 
characteristic of a code. 
While, for the most part, the Mineral Code represents a 
codification (with associated clarifications) of the law of oil and 
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gas as such had been developed by the courts, it also changed the 
law in certain respects. The process of creating the Code afforded 
an opportunity for the committee to recommend to the Legislature 
that particular decisions be repudiated as a matter of public policy. 
Examples of this include: (1) creating a meaningful remedy 
available to a lessor for unpaid or improperly paid royalties, and 
the concomitant suppression of the jurisprudential rule that 
dispensed with the need for a “putting in default” prior to filing 
suit against the mineral lessee;89 (2) altering the rule that the use of 
a mineral servitude to a lesser extent than contemplated by the 
grant (or reservation) resulted in the limitation of the servitude as 
to modes of use in which the servitude owner had not engaged;90 
(3) overruling cases which had held that production from a well 
situated off of a tract burdened by a mineral royalty, but situated 
within a conventional unit, had the effect of interrupting 
prescription as to the entire tract burdened by the mineral royalty;91 
and (4) providing that there must be some relationship between the 
servitude owner and the person using the servitude in order for 
prescription to be interrupted by such use.92 
Like all other statutory enactments, the Louisiana Mineral 
Code is subject to continuous review by the Louisiana State Law 
Institute through its Mineral Code Committee.93 The purposes and 
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duties of the Louisiana State Law Institute include the duty to 
“consider needed improvements in both substantive and adjective 
law and to make recommendations concerning the same to the 
legislature;”94 “[t]o examine and study the civil law of Louisiana 
and the Louisiana jurisprudence and statutes of the state with a 
view of discovering defects and inequities and of recommending 
needed reforms,”95 and “[t]o recommend from time to time such 
changes in the law as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate 
antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law of the 
state, both civil and criminal, into harmony with modern 
conditions.”96 
C. Retroactive Application of the Louisiana Mineral Code 
As stated, the Louisiana Mineral Code went into effect on 
January 1, 1975. Obviously, on that date, there were many mineral 
rights—mineral servitudes, mineral royalties, mineral leases—then 
in existence. To what extent can the provisions of the Mineral 
Code be constitutionally applied to mineral rights then in effect?97 
Article 214 speaks to the issue of the permissible retroactive 
application of the Mineral Code. It reads that, “[t]he provisions of 
this Code shall apply to all mineral rights, including those existing 
on the effective date hereof; but no provision may be applied to 
divest already vested rights or to impair the obligation of 
contracts.”98 
Beyond this statutory statement, there is a constitutional 
prohibition against the enactment of an “ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts . . . .”99 
The Comments to Article 214 state, as follows: 
There are strong reasons why the Mineral Code should be 
retrospective, at least in the sense that to the extent possible 
it should apply to existing rights. There are many mineral 
servitudes, mineral royalties, and mineral leases 
outstanding at any given point in time. If comprehensive 
mineral legislation were made applicable only to rights 
created after its effective date, the number of outstanding 
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rights at that time would assure that there would be two 
clear and distinct bodies of mineral law in the state for 
many years to come. One would be the ‘old law’ as 
developed by analogy to provisions of the Civil Code 
which would apply to rights already existing on the 
effective date of the legislation. The other would consist of 
the Mineral Code and the interpretive jurisprudence 
applicable to rights created after enactment of the Mineral 
Code. The resultant difficulties in judicial administration 
are readily discernible. Additionally, the purpose of 
codification would be substantially frustrated. 
The chosen approach to this problem is to adopt a general 
principle making the provisions of the code retrospective in 
operation to the extent not violative of the state and federal 
constitutions. Thus, unless an individual can satisfy a court 
that he is deprived of a vested right without just 
compensation or that the obligations of a contract are 
impaired, the rules specified in the Mineral Code apply to 
both existing and future rights. This approach was regarded 
as the only practical one.100  
Louisiana courts have grappled with this issue of the 
applicability of the Mineral Code to mineral rights that were in 
existence on its effective date. Hence, guided by Article 124, the 
court in GMB Gas Corporation v. Cox stated: 
The rights in dispute were created prior to the January 1, 
1975, effective date of the Mineral Code. Although the 
Code clearly resolves the issue presented in this case, there 
may be constitutional questions presented in giving 
retroactive effect to the provisions of the code that affect 
vested rights. To establish stability in this area of the law, 
the provisions of the Mineral Code should be followed on 
pre-code issues which have not been clearly resolved by the 
jurisprudence. This approach to the problem is supported 
by the pronounced intent in the introduction to the Code by 
the Louisiana Law Institute that it is intended to be a 
codification and clarification of the already existing body 
of jurisprudence relating to mineral ownership in this state. 
The Code further represents an expression of the legislature 
as to what it considered the law should be in those areas 
where the courts had not specifically ruled.101 
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In Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, on original hearing, applied Article 40 of the Mineral Code 
to a pre-Code factual situation, and held that the “production of oil 
and gas would suffice to interrupt prescription for the strip-mining 
of lignite.”102 
On rehearing, the Court reversed itself, finding that it could not 
apply Article 40 (which unquestionably represented a change in 
the prior law), saying: 
Concerning the court of appeal’s application of the logic as 
expressed in GMB Gas Corp., supra, we respond by 
quoting the following excerpt from 38 La. L. Rev. 378 
(1978): 
An inquiry into the meaning of the old law should be 
guided by article 1 of the Civil Code, which states ‘Law is 
a solemn expression of the legislative will.’ Therefore, in 
seeking to ascertain whether new law has destroyed rights 
under old law, courts must do more than merely examine 
whether there is a four-square case in point. Rights long 
established under the Civil Code or legislation are often so 
clearly vested that there is no need for controversy or 
litigation. Legislation, as much as any case, can vest rights. 
Therefore, future decisions ought to analyze Civil Code 
regimes antedating the Mineral Code, irrespective of 
jurisprudence or the absence thereof.103 
Finding, on rehearing, that the pre-Code mineral law was not to 
the same effect as Article 40, the court held that “the right to strip-
mine for lignite has prescribed. Furthermore, since the defendants 
enjoyed the right by title to “all mineral rights” and only drilled for 
oil and gas, their servitude is reduced to that which they preserved 
(art. 798).”104 
In Andrus v. Kahao, the Louisiana Supreme Court, on 
rehearing, reversed its original opinion and held that its prior 
precedents (originally overruled in the original opinion) “created 
rules of property” which should not be overruled.105 The court 
found the holding in those cases to have been codified in the 
Mineral Code, and, thus, to overrule the prior precedents would be 
inconsistent with the pronouncements of the Code.106 
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In Adobe Oil and Gas Corporation v. MacDonell, the 
Louisiana Third Circuit had before it the issue of a mineral royalty 
interest created prior to the effective date of the Louisiana Mineral 
Code, and whether the provisions of the Code could validly be 
applied to the pre-Code factual situation.107 In particular, the court 
noted that the new Article 89 of the Mineral Code altered pre-Code 
jurisprudence as it relates to the interruptive effect of production 
from a unit well as it related to a portion of the unit tract situated 
outside of the geographic confines of the voluntary unit.108 
The Court—relying on jurisprudence to the effect that “rights 
are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has 
become the property of some particular person or persons as a 
present interest”—held, “[g]iven the conflicting state of the pre-
code jurisprudence in this area, we conclude that the [identified 
parties] acquired no vested rights which would prohibit the 
retroactive application of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
31:89.”109 
D. Influence of Laws and Decisions of Other States 
Because of the nature of the oil and gas industry, and in 
recognition of the fact that there are certain issues, practices and 
instruments which are common in many oil and gas producing 
states, the courts of Louisiana have occasionally taken cognizance 
of the published decisions of other states where a particular issue 
has not previously been considered by a court in Louisiana. 
As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, “[a]lthough the 
decisions of other jurisdictions are not controlling on the Courts of 
Louisiana, if they determine an issue practically identical with the 
one under consideration, they possess at least a persuasive effect 
and merit attention.”110 
It has additionally been stated by another court, as follows: 
Of course, such authorities [from courts of another state] 
are not binding on the courts of Louisiana; but as they 
determine an issue practically identical with the one in the 
instant case and constitute expressions of the highest courts 
of the named states, they possess at least a persuasive effect 
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and merit our consideration and a discussion in this 
opinion.111 
The most prominent example of the influence of a foreign court 
is the fact that the Louisiana law pertaining to the doctrine of 
production “in paying quantities” finds its genesis in a ruling of the 
Supreme Court of Texas. Indeed, as noted in the official comment 
to Article 124 of the Mineral Code, Louisiana’s current law on this 
subject is fashioned in large part on the pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court of Texas in Clifton v. Koontz.112 Cases from other 
oil and gas producing states have also been considered in litigation 
over royalty payments based upon “market value”113 and on the 
interpretation of the model form operating agreement.114 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code represented the 
culmination of many years of labor by the academia and practicing 
bar in Louisiana. The fact that the Code has been amended on so 
few occasions since 1975 is a testament to those who lent their 
talent and knowledge to its creation. Those who engage in the oil 
and gas industry—as well as landowners and other stakeholders in 
that endeavor—have benefited greatly by the ability to go to one 
consolidated source in order to ascertain the “ground rules” which 
govern that undertaking. 
It is hoped that an understanding of the history which 
culminated in the adoption of the Mineral Code would be 
beneficial to all constituencies of the industry, in order to 
determine how those “ground rules” affect their property interests 
which the Louisiana Supreme Court has characterized as “the most 
valuable property in the state.”115 Referring later to this statement, 
Justice Fournet stated that, “since [1918],” such “property has . . . 
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mushroomed into an industry of almost unbelievably gigantic 
proportions.”116 
Credit for the development of this “unbelievably gigantic” 
industry is due to both the aforementioned “pioneers,” and, most 
importantly, the judges who sorted out the various arguments and 
in large part established a basic set of “ground rules” that were 
both thoughtful and consistent. 
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